

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
DIVISION**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ANTHONY DION CLAY,

Defendant.

No. 07-mj-26

ORDER

This matter comes before the court pursuant to the government's motion for detention made at the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer. The court held an evidentiary hearing on this motion on February 14, 2007, at which the defendant was present and represented by F. David Eastman. The government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Sean Berry. The government's motion for detention is granted.

The criminal complaint in this matter arises out of a series of controlled buys of crack cocaine from the defendant. At the time of these alleged offenses, the defendant was on probation for another drug trafficking felony. Also while on that probation, the defendant was charged with eluding from the police in a very high speed chase. The defendant was previously convicted of criminal trespass in 1998, possession of a controlled substance in 1996, manufacture/delivery of marijuana in 1997, battery in 1998, possession of marijuana in 2002, interference with official acts in 2002, disorderly conduct in 2005, possession of a controlled substance in 2005, and domestic abuse in 2005.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code § 3142(e), the judicial officer must determine whether any condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community in deciding whether to grant the government's motion for detention. Detention can be based on a showing either of dangerousness or risk of flight, both are not required. United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985). The standard is "reasonable assurance"; the court cannot order the detention because there are no conditions which would guarantee appearance and safety. United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1985). The grounds relied upon by a judicial officer to support a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, the burden of proof on the issue of risk of flight is by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Orta, *supra*.

The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, take into account the available information concerning -- (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including -- (A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to

believe that the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). This rebuttable presumption arises only if the defendant is charged in at least one count subject to these penalties. United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985).

The rebuttable presumption of § 3142(e) creates a burden of production upon the defendant, not a burden of persuasion. The purpose of the rebuttable presumption is to shift the burden to the defendant to establish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release sufficient to reasonably assure that the defendant will not engage in dangerous criminal activity pending trial. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1985). Although most rebuttable presumptions found in the law disappear when any evidence is presented by the opponent of the presumption, the rebuttable presumption of § 3142(e) is not such a "bursting bubble." United States v. Jessup, supra, at 383. Thus, in order to rebut the presumption, the defendant must produce some evidence; and the Magistrate Judge should still keep in mind the fact that Congress has found that certain drug offenders, as a general rule, pose special risks of flight. United States v. Jessup, supra, at 384. Although this court is unable to find any case from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly construing the rebuttable presumption of § 3142(e), other circuits have adopted the rationale of Jessup. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1237 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Alatisha, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

In this case, it is the fact that the defendant was on probation for a drug offense at the time of the alleged offenses in the complaint that causes him to be detained. His criminal history, including failures to appear and the recent eluding charge suggest that he is both a danger to the community and a risk of flight if released.

The court has examined the factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) and weighed the evidence according to the standards noted above. Pursuant to the evidence and the

rebuttable presumption of § 3142(e), the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community upon the defendant's release. The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the release of the defendant would pose a serious risk of flight. The defendant was advised in open court of his right to a prompt resolution of any appeal of this order.


Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED

1. That the defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal.

2. The Attorney General shall afford the defendant reasonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel while detained.

February 15, 2007.



JOHN A. JARVEY
Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT